# The Great Lockdown and the Big Stimulus: Tracing the Pandemic Possibility Frontier for the U.S.

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Slides at http://benjaminmoll.com/PPF\_slides/

# What We Do

- US policy response to COVID-19:
  - Lockdown: workplace and social sector
  - Stimulus: CARES Act
- Goal: quantify trade-offs
  - Aggregate: Lives versus livelihoods
  - Distributional: Who bears the economic costs?
- Approach: distributional Pandemic Possibility Frontier (PPF)
  - · Compare policies without taking stand on economic value of life
  - · Seek policies that flatten and shift the frontier

# How We Do It

- Integrated SIR + Heterogeneous Agent model with necessary ingredients
  - Sectors: (i) regular; (ii) social; (iii) home production
  - Types of labor: (i) workplace; (ii) remote; (iii) home production
  - Occupations: (i) flexibility; (ii) sectoral intensity; (iii) essentiality
  - Two-way behavioral feedback: between virus & economic activity
- Economic exposure to pandemic correlated with financial vulnerability
- Calibrate model to U.S. economy and examine counterfactuals
  - Laissez-faire vs lockdowns vs fiscal stimulus (CARES Act)
  - Smarter policies: (i) targeted lockdowns; (ii) Pigouvian taxes

# What We Find

- 1. Economic welfare costs of pandemic: large and heterogeneous
  - Regardless of the policy response
  - · Laissez-faire vs lockdown: who bears the cost differs
  - Large welfare costs for middle of earnings distribution
- 2. Slope of PPF varies with length lockdown
  - Driven by hospital beds constraint and eventual arrival of vaccine
  - · Reconcile conflicting views on extent of health-wealth trade-off
- 3. U.S. CARES Act:
  - Reduced economic cost by 20% on average, highly redistributive
  - Explains rapid recovery in consumption of poor households
- 4. Taxation-based alternatives to lockdown: favorable mean trade-off but more dispersion

<sup>ightarrow</sup> dimensions not considering today

# Outline

#### 1. Model

2. Parameterization

3. Results

4. Conclusions

5. Linked Slides

# **Epidemiological Model**

- *S<sub>t</sub>*: susceptible
- $\mathcal{I}_t$ : infectious
- $\mathcal{R}_t$ : recovered

- $\mathcal{E}_t$ : exposed = latent virus, not yet infectious
- $C_t$ : critical = in ICU, may ultimately die
- $\mathcal{N}_t$ : population =  $\mathcal{S}_t + \mathcal{E}_t + \mathcal{I}_t + \mathcal{C}_t + \mathcal{R}_t$

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{\mathcal{S}}_t \\ \dot{\mathcal{E}}_t \\ \dot{\mathcal{I}}_t \\ \dot{\mathcal{C}}_t \\ \dot{\mathcal{R}}_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -\beta_t \frac{\mathcal{I}_t}{\mathcal{N}_t} & \beta_t \frac{\mathcal{I}_t}{\mathcal{N}_t} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & -\lambda_E & \lambda_E & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & -\lambda_I & \lambda_I \chi & \lambda_I (1-\chi) \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -\lambda_C & \lambda_C (1-P(\mathcal{C}_t, \mathcal{C}_{\max})) \\ \lambda_R & 0 & 0 & 0 & -\lambda_R \end{bmatrix}^{\mathsf{T}} \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{S}_t \\ \mathcal{E}_t \\ \mathcal{I}_t \\ \mathcal{C}_t \\ \mathcal{R}_t \end{bmatrix}$$

• Deaths (flow)  $\dot{\mathcal{D}}_t = P(\mathcal{C}_t, \mathcal{C}_{max})\lambda_C \mathcal{C}_t$ , cumulative deaths  $\mathcal{D}_t$ 

#### Two key features:

- 1. Death probability of  $C_t$ 's depends on  $C_t \ge \max ICU$  capacity  $C_{\max}$
- 2.  $\beta_t = \beta(C_{st}, L_{wt}, t)$ : transmission depends on economic activity and time

→ lockdowns in SIR models

# **Occupations (j)**

	Flexibile	Rigid	
C-intensive	Software engineer, architect	Car mechanic, miner	
S-intensive	Event planner, social scientist	Waiter, shop assistant	
Essential	Police, nurse, supermarket clerk		

1. Flexibility: substitutability between remote and workplace hours

- Total labor supply =  $L_w^j + \phi^j L_r^j$
- 2. Employment intensities in social versus regular sector ,  $(\xi_s^j, \xi_c^j)$

$$Y_{i} = Z_{i} N_{i}^{\alpha_{i}} K_{i}^{1-\alpha_{i}}, \quad N_{i} = \left[\sum_{j=1}^{J} \left(\xi_{i}^{j}\right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left(N_{i}^{j}\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad i \in \{s, c\}$$

3. Essential occupations: not affected by workplace lockdown

# Households

- Period utility:  $U[c, s, h] V[\ell_w, \ell_r, h]$ 
  - c: regular consumption
  - $\ell_w$ : workplace hours
  - *h*: home production

- s: social consumption
- $\ell_r$ : remote hours

# Households

- Period utility:  $U[c, v_s(\dot{D})s, h] V[v_\ell(\dot{D})\ell_w, \ell_r, h]$ 
  - c: regular consumption
  - $\ell_w$ : workplace hours
  - *h*: home production

- s: social consumption
- $\ell_r$ : remote hours
- $v_s$ ,  $v_\ell$ : disutility of infection risk ("fear factor")
- Externality: when choosing  $s, \ell_w$ , do not take into account effect on  $\dot{D}_t$ , disutility of others
- Budget constraint of healthy household working in occupation j

$$\dot{b} = (1-\tau)w^{j}z\left(\ell_{w} + \phi^{j}\ell_{r}\right) + r^{b}b + T - c - p_{s}s - d - \chi(d,a)$$
$$\dot{a} = r^{a}a + d$$

• b: liquid assets

- a: illiquid assets
- $\phi^j \in [0, 1]$ : flexibility of occupation *j*
- $\chi$ : transaction cost
- Sick households (= C, in ICU): cannot produce, gov't provides c and s

# Lockdowns

1. Social sector lockdown: Mandated decrease in K utilization in s sector

 $Y_s = Z_s(\kappa_s K_s)^{\alpha_s} N_s^{1-\alpha_s}, \qquad \kappa_s < 1$ 

2. Workplace lockdown: Mandated maximum (share of) workplace hours

$$\ell_w \leq \kappa_\ell (\ell_w + \ell_r), \qquad \kappa_\ell < 1$$

- Full lockdown:  $\kappa_s = \kappa_{\ell} = 0$
- Lockdowns reduce infections because reduce  $\beta_t = \beta(C_{st}, L_{wt}, t)$
- Lockdowns affect same behavioral margins as pandemic...
- ... but reduce cumulative deaths for four reasons:
  - 1. reduce epidemic "overshoot" (small)
  - 2. vaccine after 24 months (small except for very long lockdowns)
  - 3. ICU constraint  $\mathcal{C}_{max}$
  - 4. "learning" = logistic time trend in  $\beta_t$

# **Remaining Model Ingredients**

#### Firms

- Monopolistic intermediate-good producers → final s,c goods
- Baseline: flexible prices (extension: sticky prices)

#### **Investment Fund**

- Illiquid assets = shares of an investment fund
- The fund owns K and equity of intermediate producers in c, s sectors

#### Government

- Issues liquid debt  $(B^g)$ , spends (G), taxes and transfers  $(\mathcal{T})$
- Central bank absorbs the additional debt needed to finance CARES Act

 $\rightarrow$  market clearing conditions

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# **Key Aspects of Parameterization**


- 1. Epidemiological block
  - SEIR parameters: epidemiological and clinical studies
- 2. Occupational parameters
  - Flexibility measures by occupation: O\*NET, ATUS
  - Sectoral employment intensities in C and S: OES, CPS
  - Earnings and liquid wealth by occupation: SIPP, CPS, SCF
- 3. Two-way feedback: virus  $\leftrightarrow$  economic activity
  - Economic activity  $\rightarrow$  virus: drop in  $R_t$  after lockdown
  - Virus  $\rightarrow$  economic activity: VSL literature

 $\rightarrow$  feedback: virus  $\rightarrow$  activity



 $\rightarrow$  feedback: activity  $\rightarrow$  virus

#### Model fits deaths data reasonably well despite simple epi block



# Outline

1. Model


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
5. Linked Slides

# Lockdown Scenario



- Calibrated to obtain decline in workplace and retail activity (Google)
- Assumption: no future lockdown in case of 2nd wave


# Laissez-faire vs Lockdown Dynamics



- Lockdown  $\rightarrow$  second wave, but fewer cumulative deaths
- Lockdown  $\rightarrow$  longer, deeper contraction and  ${\it W}\mbox{-shaped}$  recovery


ightarrow laissez-faire dynamics ) ( ightarrow lockdown dynamics ) ( ightarrow lockdown decomposition ) ( ightarrow cumulative deaths

# Laissez-faire vs Lockdown Dynamics



- · Large drop in income for S-intensive occupations even in laissez faire
- Lockdown  $\rightarrow$  further drop in income for C-intensive occupations


# Pandemic Possibility Frontier (PPF)



- Large average economic costs and big dispersion
- · Heterogeneity in economic costs exacerbated with longer lockdowns
- Very non-linear trade-off: role of ICU constraint and vaccine




# **Distribution of Economic Welfare Costs**




- Largest economic costs in middle of distribution
- Transfers (bottom) vs Rigid labor (middle) vs Flexible labor (top)

### **CARES Act Shifts Down the PPF**



CARES Act: stimulus checks, pandemic UI, PPP

#### **Distribution of Economic Welfare Costs**




· Big impact of CARES Act on households below the median

 $\rightarrow$  welfare cost distribution

# **Consumption Dynamics**


• US Data: biggest *y* drops, but fastest *c* recovery at the bottom of the income distribution → US data



• CARES Act redistributed heavily toward low-income households with high MPC

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#### **Smarter Alternative Polices**



Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2020)

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# Messages

- 1. Economic costs of pandemic: large and heterogeneous, regardless of lockdowns
- 2. Distributional PPF is useful for quantifying trade-offs:
  - Aggregate tradeoff between lives vs livelihoods
  - Distributional tradeoff over who bears economic burden
- 3. Non-linear PPF: reconciles conflicting views on aggregate tradeoff
- 4. Exposure correlated with vulnerability  $\Rightarrow$  scope for fiscal policy
- 5. US CARES Act:
  - Shifts PPF inward: reduces economic costs w/o increasing deaths
  - Faster recovery of spending for low income households
- 6. Pigouvian schemes alternative to lockdowns improve aggregate trade-off

# Thanks and Stay Safe!

# Outline

1. Model


2. Parameterization

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#### **Distributional Pandemic Possibility Frontier**



# **Some Dimensions we Abstract From**

- 1. Differential impact of the epidemic across age groups (Glover-Heathcote-Krueger-RiosRull, Bairoliya-Imrohoroglu, Acemoglu et al., Brotherhood-Kircher-Santos-Tertilt, ...)
- 2. Differential impacts of the epidemic across gender (Alon-Doepke-Olmstead Rumsey-Tertilt, ...)
- 3. Impact of the epidemic on deaths from other causes
- 4. Input-output linkages in production (Baqaee-Farhi, ...)
- 5. Firm balance sheets, liquidity provision to firms (Buera-Fattal Jaef-Neumeyer-Shin, Elenev-Landvoigt-VanNieuwerburgh, ...)
- 6. Costly destruction of viable employment relationships

# **Background on Lockdowns in SIR Models**

- Some vocabulary:
  - 1. Basic reproduction number:  $R_0 := \beta_0 / \lambda_I$
  - 2. Effective reproduction number:  $R_t^e := R_0 \times S_t / N_t$
  - 3. Herd immunity threshold:
  - 4. Final size of disease:

- $\mathcal{S}^*/\mathcal{N} := 1/R_0$  or  $\mathcal{R}^*/\mathcal{N} = 1 \mathcal{S}^*/\mathcal{N} = 1 1/R_0$  $\mathcal{S}_{\infty} = e^{-R_0(1-\mathcal{S}_{\infty})}$
- Two key features of SIR models:
  - 1. Infections  $\uparrow$  if  $R_t^e > 1$  or  $S > S^*$  and  $\downarrow$  otherwise
  - 2. Epidemic "overshoot": total infections > herd immunity,  $\mathcal{S}_{\infty} > \mathcal{S}^*$
- Results on lockdowns :=  $R_0 \downarrow$ 
  - Even temporary lockdowns reduce total number of infections
  - But total number of infections  $\geq$  herd immunity threshold
  - · Best lockdowns-only can do is eliminate epidemic "overshoot"
  - If lockdown too short or too tight, get 2nd wave

# **Market Clearing Conditions**

• Regular goods market

$$Y_c = C_c + I + G + \chi$$

Social goods market

$$Y_s = C_s$$

• Labor market for each occupation

$$N_c^j + N_s^j = \int z(\ell_w^j(\mathfrak{h}, a, b, z) + \phi^j \ell_r^j(\mathfrak{h}, a, b, z)) d\mu, \quad j = 1, ..., 5$$

• Liquid asset market

$$B^h = B^g$$


Illiquid asset market

$$A = V_{\text{fund}}(K, \Theta_c, \Theta_s), \quad K = K_c + K_s$$

 $\rightarrow$  model ingredients

# **Epidemiological Parameters**

Description	Parameter	Value
Initial basic reproduction number	$R_0^{init} = \beta_0^{init} / \lambda_I$	2.5
Final basic reproduction number	$R_0^{end} = \beta_0^{end} / \lambda_I$	2
Avg. duration of $\mathcal{I}$ nfectious	$T_I \Rightarrow \lambda_I = 1/T_I$	4.3 days
Avg. duration of $\mathcal{E}$ xposure (latency)	$T_E \Rightarrow \lambda_E = 1/T_E$	5.0 days
Infection fatality rate	$IFR = \chi \delta_C$	$0.02 \times 0.33 = 0.066$




- Time trend in transmissions (masks,...):  $\tilde{R}_0(t) = (1 \omega(t))R_0^{\text{init}} + \omega(t)R_0^{\text{end}}, \omega(t) = \text{logistic}$
- Herd immunity threshold:  $1 1/R_0^{\text{init}} = 60\% \Rightarrow 1 1/R_0^{\text{end}} = 50\%$
- Vaccine arrival after 18 months

→ back to parameterization

# **Occupations: Flexibility**

- O\*NET: Share of tasks that can be performed at home (Dingel-Neiman)
- ATUS Q: As part of your (main) job, can you work at home?
- Systematic variation across 3-digit SOC occupations



• Two flexibility levels: high flexibility occupation if O\*NET share > 0.5.

ightarrow back to parameterization

# **Occupations: Social vs Regular Intensity**

NAICS code	<b>Sector</b> $C$ (value added share: 0.74)	NAICS code	<b>Sector</b> $S$ (value added share: 0.26)
11	Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	44-45	Retail trade
21	Mining	481 - 482 - 483	Air, rail, and water transportation
22	Utilities	485-487-488	Transit and scenic transportation
23	Construction	61	Educational services
31-32-33	Manufacturing	62	Health care and social assistance services
42	Wholesale trade	531 - 532 - 533	Real estate, rental and leasing services
484 - 486	Truck and pipeline transportation	71	Arts, entertainment, and recreation services
491 - 492	Postal transportation	72	Accommodation and food services
493	Warehousing and storage	81	Other services (excluding P.A.)
51	Information		
52	Finance and insurance		
_	Housing services		
54 - 55	Professional, technical, and scientific services		
56	Management and administrative services		

→ back to parameterizatior

#### **Occupations: Exposure vs Vulnerability**

Correlation between Flexibility and Median Liquid Wealth Across Occupations 0.9 ONET (share of teleworkable jobs) • . . Weighted Correlation: 0.51 0.1 -1000 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 0 Median liquid wealth (\$)

→ back to parameterizatior

# **Occupations: Exposure vs Vulnerability**

Occupation	$\phi^{j}$	$\boldsymbol{\xi}_{c}^{j}$	$\xi_s^j$	Empl Share	Earnings	Liq Wealth	_ _ Source: O*NET,
Essential	0.1	0.19	0.35	0.31	\$45 <i>K</i>	\$1,300	
CF: C-intensive, Flexible	1	0.57	0.12	0.21	\$79 <i>K</i>	\$18,400	
SF: S-intensive, Flexible	1	0.03	0.19	0.10	\$51 <i>K</i>	\$8,900	
CR: C-intensive, Rigid	0.1	0.19	0.04	0.13	\$45 <i>K</i>	\$1,000	
SR: S-intensive, Rigid	0.1	0.04	0.29	0.24	\$32 <i>K</i>	\$900	_
							-

OES, SIPP

- Estimate stochastic processes for household wage dynamics by occupation from PSID
- To match liquid wealth we add occupational-specific wedge on liquid rate


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# Feedback: Economic Activity to Virus

• Transmission rate for infections:

$$\beta_t = \tilde{\beta}_t \left(\frac{C_{st}}{\bar{C}_s}\right)^{\nu_\beta^s} \left(\frac{L_{wt}}{\bar{L}_w}\right)^{\nu_\beta^w}$$

Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Data:



- Estimates of R<sub>t</sub> drop from 2.5 to 0.8 after lockdown
- Drop in acrivity of  $50\% \Rightarrow$  elasticities:  $\nu_{\beta}^{s} = \nu_{\beta}^{w} = 0.8$

→ back to parameterization

### Feedback: Virus to Economic Activity

• Parameterize utility shifters as:

$$\upsilon_{\ell}(\dot{\mathcal{D}}) = \exp\left(-\nu_{\ell}^{0}\dot{\mathcal{D}}^{\nu_{\ell}^{1}}
ight), \qquad \upsilon_{s}(\dot{\mathcal{D}}) = \exp\left(-\nu_{s}^{0}\dot{\mathcal{D}}^{\nu_{s}^{1}}
ight)$$


• Maps into VSL calculations: optimality condition for hours worked is

$$\log w_{it} = \gamma_{\ell}^{0} \left( \nu_{\ell}^{0} \dot{\mathcal{D}}_{t}^{\nu_{\ell}^{1}} \right) + \gamma_{\ell}^{1} \mathbf{X}_{it}$$


- Used to estimate monetary compensation for fatality risk
  - increasing and concave in risk Greenstone et al. (2014), Lavetti (2020)
- Target VSL between \$4-10M for fatality rates between 1/1,000 and 1/10,000 per quarter (relevant magnitude for COVID-19)

ightarrow back to parameterization


#### **Aggregates Dynamics: Laissez-Faire**




### **Aggregates Dynamics: Lockdown**



### **Lockdown Decomposition**




### **Cumulative infections and deaths**




Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2020)

### **Economic Welfare Cost Distribution**




# **Production Possibility Frontier by Occupation**






 C-intensive, rigid occupations (green line) hurt most by longer lockdowns

# Modeling CARES Act




- Stimulus checks: unconditional transfer of \$1,900 to everyone
- Pandemic UI: replacement earnings loss by decile (Ganong-Vavra)
- Paycheck Protection Program: part wage & profit subsidies (half each)
- 401(k) withdrawals up to \$100,000: reduction in withdrawal cost

#### Aggregates Dynamics: Lockdown + CARES Act




### **Decomposition of CARES Act Elements**




Kaplan, Moll and Webaste (2020)

### **CARES Act by Income Quartile**




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#### **CARES Act Components by Income Quartile**



# **Consumption Dynamics by Income Quartile: US Data**



- Source: Cox-Ganong-Noel-Vavra-Wong-Farrell-Greig
- · Consumption of poor recovers faster than consumption of rich