Putting the 'Finance' into 'Public Finance': A Theory of Capital Gains Taxation

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Tax system of typical country: tax capital gains on realization (i.e. sale)

But recent policy proposals:

- tax capital gains on accrual (Biden-Harris administration,...)
- tax wealth (Piketty, Zucman, ...)



Old idea: Haig-Simons comprehensive income tax

income = consumption + Δ wealth

"Many of the distortions associated with the present system of capital gains taxation result from its deviation from the Haig-Simons approach."

"These deviations may have historical explanations but their persistence is hard to rationalize from an economic perspective."

Background: rising and fluctuating asset prices



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 Conventional view: asset prices move too much to be accounted for by changing cash flows alone ⇒ discount rate variation (Shiller, Campbell-Shiller, ...)



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 Growing positive literature: asset prices ⇒ wealth inequality Kuhn et al. (2020), Greenwald et al. (2021), Fagereng et al. (2021, 2023), Martínez-Toledano (2023)...

No guidance from standard optimal capital tax theory: No asset prices!

To wit: no 'finance' in 'public finance'

What we do: optimal redistributive taxation with changing asset prices





 $\Delta T = \tau \times \text{wealth} \times \Delta p$









Intuition: higher asset prices benefit sellers not holders

• unrealized capital gains are "paper gains" until you sell



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• unrealized capital gains are "paper gains" until you sell

In general, combination of realization-based capital gains & dividend tax

- though important differences from existing realization-based tax systems
- e.g. tax net trades to not distort portfolio choice (no lock-in effect)

Plan

- 1. Baseline model (partial equilibrium)
- 2. Two time periods, one asset, no risk
- 3. First-best
- 4. Second-best (Mirrlees)
 - Portfolio choice and lock-in effect
- 5. Back to multi-period model
- 6. Extensions
 - General equilibrium
 - Heterogeneous returns
 - Risk and borrowing
 - Borrowing versus selling
 - Bequests and sub-optimality of step-up in basis at death
 - Wealth in utility

Baseline model

Indexed by $\theta \sim F(\theta)$, differ in initial wealth $k_0(\theta)$, income profiles $\{y_t(\theta)\}_{t=0}^T$

$$V = \max_{\{c_t, k_{t+1}, b_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^T} \mathbb{E}_0 U(c_0, \dots, c_T) \quad \text{s.t.}$$
$$c_t + p_t(k_{t+1} - k_t) + q_t b_{t+1} = y_t + D_t k_t + b_t - T_t \implies R_{t+1} = \frac{D_{t+1} + p_{t+1}}{p_t}$$

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Comments

Owner-occupied housing

• $D_t = \text{imputed rents}$

Endogenous payout policy and share repurchases

• D_t = profits net of investment, p_t = total value of firm

Haig-Simons income includes unrealized capital gains

• budget constraint (without b_t for simplicity)

$$c_t + p_t(k_{t+1} - k_t) = y_t + D_t k_t$$

• add unrealized capital gains $(p_t - p_{t-1})k_t$ on both sides

$$c_t + \underbrace{p_t k_{t+1} - p_{t-1} k_t}_{\text{change in wealth}} = \underbrace{y_t + D_t k_{t-1} + (p_t - p_{t-1}) k_t}_{\text{Haig-Simons income}}$$

Comparison to setups in capital taxation literature

- 1. Partial equilibrium models with constant $R_t = \overline{R}$ (Atkinson-Stiglitz,...)
- 2. Neoclassical growth model (Chamley, ...): depends on decentralization
 - production-based asset pricing: shares in representative firm
 - BGP with $A_{t+1}/A_t = G$:

$$\overline{R} = (1/\beta)G^{1/\sigma}$$
 with $\frac{D_{t+1}}{p_t} = \overline{R} - G$ and $\frac{p_{t+1}}{p_t} = G$

• small fluctuations in discount rate $R_{t+1} = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{U'(C_t)}{U'(C_{t+1})}$

- 3. Growth models with het. households (Werning, Judd, Straub-Werning,...)
 - same as 2
- 4. Our setup
 - optimal taxation with exogenous $\{p_t, D_t\}$ and hence returns $\{R_t\}$
 - allows us to take on board discount rate variation in flexible way

Two time periods, one asset, no risk

• Investors indexed by $\theta \sim F(\theta)$

$$V = \max_{c_0, c_1, k_1} U(c_0, c_1) \quad \text{s.t.}$$
$$c_0 + p(k_1 - k_0) = y_0 - T_0$$
$$c_1 = y_1 + Dk_1$$

- Asset return $R = D/p \Rightarrow p = D/R$ (Campbell-Shiller)
- Resource constraints

$$\int c_0(\theta) dF(\theta) + \frac{p}{D} \int c_1(\theta) dF(\theta) \le Y$$
$$Y \equiv \int y_0(\theta) dF(\theta) + \frac{p}{D} \int y_1(\theta) dF(\theta) + p \int k_0(\theta) dF(\theta)$$

Two time periods, one asset, no risk

• In terms of asset sales $x \equiv k_0 - k_1$

$$V = \max_{c_0, c_1, x} U(c_0, c_1) \quad \text{s.t.}$$

$$c_0 = y_0 + px - T_0$$

$$c_1 = y_1 + D(k_0 - x)$$

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First best

Individual lump-sum taxes $T_0(\theta)$

$$\max_{c_0(\theta), c_1(\theta)} \int \omega(\theta) U(c_0(\theta), c_1(\theta)) dF(\theta) \quad \text{s.t.}$$
$$\int c_0(\theta) dF(\theta) + \frac{p}{D} \int c_1(\theta) dF(\theta) \le Y$$

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Prices and dividends (p, D) fluctuate around baseline $(\overline{p}, \overline{D})$

Design tax rule $T_0(\theta; p, D)$ that optimally redistributes given fluctuations

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Design tax rule $T_0(\theta; p, D)$ that optimally redistributes given fluctuations

$$U(c_0, c_1) = rac{c_0^{1-1/\sigma}}{1-1/\sigma} + eta rac{c_1^{1-1/\sigma}}{1-1/\sigma} \quad ext{but want to take } \sigma o 0 ext{ later}$$

Individual lump-sum taxes $T_0(\theta)$

$$\max_{c_0(\theta), c_1(\theta)} \int \omega(\theta) U(c_0(\theta), c_1(\theta)) dF(\theta) \quad \text{s.t.}$$
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Prices and dividends (p, D) fluctuate around baseline $(\overline{p}, \overline{D})$

Design tax rule $T_0(\theta; p, D)$ that optimally redistributes given fluctuations

$$U(c_0, c_1) = G(C(c_0, c_1)), \quad C(c_0, c_1) = \left(c_0^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + \beta c_1^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad G(C) = \frac{C^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

Proposition: Suppose the asset price increases by Δp while dividends *D* remain unchanged. The change in the optimal tax burden $T_0(\theta)$ is

$$\Delta T_0(\theta) = x(\theta) \Delta p - \Omega(\theta) X \Delta p$$
 aggregate
asset sales
100% tax on
realized capital gains $\frac{\omega(\theta)^{1/\gamma}}{\int \omega(\theta')^{1/\gamma} dF(\theta')}$

- Second term: X = 0 for particular parameters or in general equilibrium
- Tax on net transactions
- Subsidy if x < 0
- Holds even for large Δp



Change in investor's total budget that keeps initial consumption bundle affordable at new prices



$$\Delta T_{0}(\theta) = x(\theta)\Delta p + \frac{p}{D}k_{1}(\theta)\Delta D - \Omega(\theta) \left[X\Delta p + \frac{p}{D}K_{1}\Delta D \right]$$

tax on realized tax on dividend income

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tax on realized
capital gains tax on dividend
income

Alternatively, set $\Delta T_0 = x \Delta p - \Omega(\theta) X \Delta p$ and $\Delta T_1 = k_1 \Delta D - \Omega(\theta) K_1 \Delta D$

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Special case $\Delta D/\Delta p = D/p$? Asset price change driven **only** by dividends.

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$$\implies = \frac{p}{D}(k_{0}(\theta) - x(\theta))\frac{D}{p}\Delta p$$

Alternatively, set $\Delta T_0 = x \Delta p - \Omega(\theta) X \Delta p$ and $\Delta T_1 = k_1 \Delta D - \Omega(\theta) K_1 \Delta D$

Special case $\Delta D/\Delta p = D/p$? Asset price change driven **only** by dividends.

Special case: fixed discount rates, only dividends change

Proposition: Suppose the asset price increases by Δp while the discount rate D/p remains unchanged. The change in the optimal tax burden $T_0(\theta)$ is

$$\Delta T_0(\theta) = k_0(\theta) \Delta p - \Omega(\theta) K_0 \Delta p \quad \text{wealth}$$
100% tax on
wealth increase
Special case: fixed discount rates, only dividends change

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- Tax on wealth/unrealized gains is knife-edge!
- Later: multi-period or heterogeneous returns
 ⇒ don't work in general even with dividend-driven *p*-changes
- In general, tax must depend on realizations

Consumption tax Tax on total returns

Second best

Distortive nonlinear taxes

- 1. Capital sales tax $T_x(px)$
- 2. Wealth tax $T_k(pk_1)$

$$c_{0} = y_{0} + px - T_{x}(px)$$

$$c_{1} = Dk_{1} + y_{1} - T_{k}(pk_{1})$$

$$k_{1} = k_{0} - x$$

Other instruments similar, e.g. dividend/capital income tax $T_D(Dk_1)$

Portfolio choice? Momentarily...

How the optimal tax responds to a rising asset price



How the optimal tax responds to a rising asset price



Role of the IES



Proposition: Suppose $V'_{FB}(\theta) \in [y'_0(\theta), D'_k(\theta) + y'_1(\theta)] \forall \theta$. Then the solution to the second-best problem converges to the first-best allocation as $\sigma \to 0$.

Wealth tax

► Taxes in levels



Wealth tax

▶ Taxes in levels



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Realization-based tax may distort portfolio choice

bond adjustment cost $c_0 = px - qb - \chi(x) + y_0 - T_0$ $c_1 = D(k_0 - x) + b + y_1$

With observable trades x and b, optimum can be implemented with a tax

$$T(px - qb - \chi(x))$$

- Undistorted portfolio choice \Rightarrow no lock-in effect
- Tax on net trades

Back to multi-period model

Investors

$$\max_{\{c_t,k_{t+1}\}} \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \left(\sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t c_t^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma(1-\gamma)}{\sigma-1}} \quad \text{s.t.}$$

$$p_t k_{t+1} + c_t = y_t + D_t k_t + p_t k_t - T_t$$

Rates of return:

$$R_{t+1} = \frac{D_{t+1} + p_{t+1}}{p_t}, \qquad R_{0 \to t} = R_1 \cdot R_2 \cdots R_t$$

Experiment

- Start at some baseline (steady state or BGP) with tax system $\overline{T}_t(\theta)$
- Then prices and dividends $\{p_t, D_t\}_{t=0}^T$ change
- Example:



Taxing changing asset prices in multi-period model

Proposition: Suppose asset prices change by $\{\Delta p_t\}_{t=0}^T$ and dividends by $\{\Delta D_t\}_{t=0}^T$. The change in the optimal taxes $\{\Delta T_t(\theta)\}_{t=0}^T$ is such that

$$\sum_{t=0}^{T} R_{0 \to t}^{-1} \Delta T_t(\theta) = \sum_{t=0}^{T} R_{0 \to t}^{-1} [x_t(\theta) \Delta p_t + k_t(\theta) \Delta D_t - \Omega(\theta) (X_t \Delta p_t + K_t \Delta D_t)]$$

Example:

$$\Delta T_t(\theta) = x_t(\theta) \Delta p_t + k_t(\theta) \Delta D_t - \Omega(\theta) (X_t \Delta p_t + K_t \Delta D_t) \quad \forall t$$

Special case: constant discount rates

$$\frac{\Delta D_{t+1} + \Delta p_{t+1}}{\Delta p_t} = \frac{D_{t+1} + p_{t+1}}{p_t} \quad \text{i.e.,} \quad R_{t+1} \text{ unchanged, only } R_0 \text{ affected}$$
$$\Rightarrow \qquad \sum_{t=0}^T R_{0 \to t}^{-1} \Delta T_t(\theta) = [k_0(\theta) - \Omega(\theta)K_0](\Delta D_0 + \Delta p_0)$$

Tax unrealized gain at t = 0 but tax on all future gains = $0 \Rightarrow Haig-Simons$

• perfect foresight so Δp_0 already incorporates all news about $\{\Delta D_t\}_{t=1}^T$

Even more special case:

- constant discount rates
- at each $t \ge 0$, MIT shock to $\{D_{t+s}\}$ so that realized $R_t = \frac{D_t + p_t}{p_{t-1}}$ moves

$$\sum_{s \ge t} R_{t \to t+s}^{-1} \Delta T_s(\theta) = [k_t(\theta) - \Omega(\theta) K_t] (\Delta \rho_t + \Delta D_t)$$

100 % tax on unrealized capital gains at each $t \ge 0 = \text{Haig-Simons}$

What are Δp and ΔD ? An example

$$\Delta T_t(\theta) = x_t(\theta) \Delta p_t + k_t(\theta) \Delta D_t - \Omega(\theta) (X_t \Delta p_t + K_t \Delta D_t) \quad \forall t$$

Old BGP:

$$\overline{D_t} = G^t \overline{D_0} \quad \overline{R}_{t+1} = \overline{R} \quad \overline{p_t} = G^t \overline{p_0}$$



Extensions

- General equilibrium
- Heterogeneous returns
- Risk and borrowing
- Borrowing versus selling
- Bequests and sub-optimality of step-up in basis at death
- Wealth in utility

Conclusion

When asset valuations change, optimal taxes change by

 $\Delta T = \tau \times \text{sales} \times \Delta p$

In general, combination of realization-based capital gains + dividend taxes

- no need to know source of capital gains
- important differences from existing realization-based tax systems

Wealth or accrual-based taxes are knife-edge at best

- beyond baseline: may not work even with only cashflow-driven Δp
- may redistribute in "wrong" direction

Linked backup slides

Counterparty has stochastic discount factor

 $m_{t \rightarrow t+s}$

which prices the two assets:

$$p_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{s=1}^{T-t} m_{t \to t+s} D_{t+s} \right] \text{ and } q_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{s=1}^{T-t} m_{t \to t+s} \right]$$

Consumption tax • back

Proposition: Suppose the asset price increases by Δp and dividends by ΔD . The change in the optimal taxes $T_0(\theta)$ and $T_1(\theta)$ is

$$\Delta T_t(\theta) = \Delta \hat{c}_t(\theta) - \Omega(\theta) \Delta C_t$$

where $\Delta \hat{c}_t$ is the change in consumption holding taxes fixed.

No need to know source of capital gains: Δp vs. ΔD !

Kaldor's expenditure tax!

$$c_{0} + a_{1} = y_{0} + R_{0}a_{1} - T_{0}, \qquad c_{1} = y_{1} + R_{1}a_{1}$$
where $R_{0} = p/p_{-1}, R_{1} = D/p$ which are $R_{t+1} = \frac{D_{t+1} + p_{t+1}}{p_{t}}$ with $D_{0} = p_{1} = 0$
• note: $p \uparrow$ holding D fixed $\Rightarrow R_{0} \uparrow$ but $R_{1} \downarrow$

Proposition: Suppose the asset price increases by Δp and dividends by ΔD resulting in return changes ΔR_0 and ΔR_1 . Then

$$\Delta T_0(\theta) = a_0(\theta) \Delta R_0 + \frac{1}{R_1} a_1(\theta) \Delta R_1 - \Omega(\theta) \left[A_0(\theta) \Delta R_0 + \frac{1}{R_1} A_1(\theta) \Delta R_1 \right]$$

Alternatively, set $\Delta T_0 = a \Delta R_0 - \Omega(\theta) A_0 \Delta R_0$ and $\Delta T_1 = a_1 \Delta R_1 - \Omega(\theta) A_1 \Delta R_1$

Special case: constant discount rate $\Delta R_1 = 0 \Rightarrow$ Haig-Simons

But Haig-Simons in all other cases $\Delta R_1 \neq 0$

Tax payments potentially volatile: large tax, followed by large rebate

Optimal wealth tax schedule • back



Extensions

Extensions

- 1. General equilibrium
- 2. Heterogeneous returns
- 3. Aggregate Risk
- 4. Borrowing versus Selling
- 5. Bequests and Suboptimality of Step-Up in Basis at Death

General Equilibrium

- Suppose capital is in fixed supply $K_0 = K_1 = K$
- Asset price p^* adjusts to clear market:

$$p^* = \beta D \left(\frac{Y_0}{Y_1 + DK} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

Proposition: Suppose the asset price increases by Δp^* while dividends *D* remain unchanged. The change in the optimal tax burden $T_0(\theta)$ is

$$\Delta T_0(\theta) = x(\theta) \Delta \rho^*$$

Heterogeneous Cashflows

$$c_0 + qb = p(k_0 - k_1) - \chi(k_0 - k_1) + y_0 - T_0$$
$$c_1 = D(\theta)k_1 + b + y_1$$

- heterogeneous dividends $D(\theta), \theta \sim F(\theta)$
- convex adjustment cost

Proposition: Suppose the asset price increases by Δp while dividends $D(\theta)$ remain unchanged. The change in the optimal tax $T_0(\theta)$ is

$$\Delta T_0(\theta) \approx x(\theta) \Delta p - \Omega(\theta) x \Delta p - \frac{1}{2} \chi''(x(\theta)) \Delta x(\theta)^2$$

Suppose $\chi(x) = \kappa x^2$ and capital is in fixed supply

Then

$$p^* = q \int D(\theta) dF(\theta)$$

Asset price changes for everyone when some dividends change...

... even for investors whose dividends did not change!

 \Rightarrow Haig-Simons

Risk and borrowing

Two assets

Aggregate return risk $D(s), s \in S$, probabilities $\pi(s)$

$$c_0 = p(k_0 - k_1) + qb + y_0 - T_0$$

$$c_1(s) = D(s)k_1 - b + y_1 - T_1(s)$$

Asset prices:

- 1. capital $p = \mathbb{E}[M(s)D(s)]$
- 2. bond $q = \mathbb{E}[M(s)]$

where M(s) = SDF of rep counterparty in global financial markets

Individual lump-sum taxes $T_0(\theta)$, $T_1(\theta, s)$ with $\int T_1(\theta, s) dF(\theta) = 0$, all s

$$\max_{c_0(\theta), c_1(\theta, s), \mu(\theta)} \int \omega(\theta) U(c_0(\theta), \mu(\theta)) dF(\theta) \quad \text{s.t.}$$
$$\int c_0(\theta) dF(\theta) + q \int c_1(\theta, s) dF(\theta) = Y(s) \quad \forall s$$

$$U(c_{0},\mu) = \frac{C(c_{0},\mu)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}, \ C(c_{0},\mu) = \left(c_{0}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + \beta\mu^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \ \mu = \left(\sum_{s} c_{1}(s)^{1-\alpha}\pi(s)\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$

Special case: changing discount rates (SDF)

Proposition: Suppose the SDF M(s) changes such that asset prices change by $(\Delta p, \Delta q)$. Holding fixed $\mathbb{E}[T_1(\theta, s)M(s)/q]$, the change in the optimal tax burden $T_0(\theta)$ is

$$\Delta T_0(\theta) = x(\theta)\Delta p + b(\theta)\Delta q - \Omega(\theta)[X\Delta p + B\Delta q]$$

- Borrowers/savers are winners/losers from change in *q*
- No borrowing constraint (would not matter with first-best tax instruments)