

Lecture 8

The Workhorse Model of Income and Wealth Distribution in Macroeconomics

ECO 521: Advanced Macroeconomics I

Benjamin Moll

Princeton University, Fall 2016

Plan for rest of my part of course

- Only 5 lectures left
 - Chris will take over on Wednesday 10/26 (before break)
- Lecture 8 (10/10): Textbook heterogeneous agent model without aggregate shocks
- Lecture 9 (10/12): Het agent models with aggregate shocks
 - “No more excuses!” (Reiter perturbation method)
- Lecture 10 (10/17): Dirk Krueger guest lecture
 - “Macroeconomics and Household Heterogeneity”
- Lecture 11 (10/19): Het agent models with nominal rigidities
 - HANK & friends
- Lecture 12 (10/24): Estimation of heterogeneous agent models
 - Parra-Alvarez, Posch and Wang (2015)

Outline

1. Textbook heterogeneous agent model (no aggregate shocks)
 - the Aiyagari-Bewley-Huggett model
2. Some theoretical results
3. Computations

What this lecture is about

- Many interesting questions require thinking about **distributions**
 - Why are income and wealth so unequally distributed?
 - Is there a trade-off between inequality and economic growth?
 - What are the forces that lead to the concentration of economic activity in a few very large firms?
- Modeling distributions is **hard**
 - closed-form solutions are rare
 - computations are challenging
- Main idea: **solving heterogeneous agent model = solving PDEs**
 - main difference to existing continuous-time literature:
handle models for which closed-form solutions do not exist

Solving het. agent model = solving PDEs

- More precisely: a system of two PDEs
 1. **Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman** equation for individual choices
 2. **Kolmogorov Forward** equation for evolution of distribution
- Many well-developed methods for analyzing and solving these
 - codes: <http://www.princeton.edu/~moll/HACTproject.htm>
- Apparatus is very **general**: applies to **any** heterogeneous agent model with continuum of atomistic agents
 1. heterogeneous households (Aiyagari, Bewley, Huggett,...)
 2. heterogeneous producers (Hopenhayn,...)
- can be extended to handle aggregate shocks (Krusell-Smith,...)

Computational Advantages relative to Discrete Time


1. **Borrowing constraints** only show up in **boundary conditions**
 - FOCs always hold with “=”
2. **“Tomorrow is today”**
 - FOCs are “static”, compute by hand: $c^{-\gamma} = v_a(a, y)$
3. **Sparsity**
 - solving Bellman, distribution = inverting matrix
 - but matrices very sparse (“tridiagonal”)
 - reason: continuous time \Rightarrow one step left or one step right
4. **Two birds with one stone**
 - tight link between solving (HJB) and (KF) for distribution
 - matrix in discrete (KF) is **transpose** of matrix in discrete (HJB)
 - reason: diff. operator in (KF) is **adjoint** of operator in (HJB)

Real Payoff: extends to more general setups

- non-convexities
- stopping time problems
- multiple assets
- aggregate shocks


What you'll be able to do at end of this lecture

- Joint distribution of income and wealth in Aiyagari model



What you'll be able to do at end of this lecture

- Experiment: effect of one-time redistribution of wealth



What you'll be able to do at end of this lecture

Video of convergence back to steady state

https://www.dropbox.com/s/op5u2n1ifmmer2o/distribution_tax.mp4?dl=0

Textbook Heterogeneous Agent Model:
Aiyagari-Bewley-Huggett

Households

are heterogeneous in their wealth a and income y , solve

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_t\}_{t \geq 0}} \mathbb{E}_0 \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} u(c_t) dt \quad \text{s.t.} \\ da_t = (y_t + r_t a_t - c_t) dt \\ y_t \in \{y_1, y_2\} \text{ Poisson with intensities } \lambda_1, \lambda_2 \\ a_t \geq \underline{a} \end{aligned}$$

- c_t : consumption
- u : utility function, $u' > 0$, $u'' < 0$.
- ρ : discount rate
- r_t : interest rate
- $\underline{a} > -\infty$: borrowing limit e.g. if $\underline{a} = 0$, can only save

later: carries over to $y_t =$ general diffusion process.

Stationary Equilibrium

Bonds in zero net supply (Huggett)

$$0 = S(r) := \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} ag_1(a)da + \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} ag_2(a)da \quad (\text{EQ})$$

$$\rho v_i(a) = \max_c u(c) + v_i'(a)(y_i + ra - c) + \lambda_i(v_j(a) - v_i(a)) \quad (\text{HJB})$$

$$0 = -\frac{d}{da}[s_i(a)g_i(a)] - \lambda_i g_i(a) + \lambda_j g_j(a), \quad (\text{KF})$$

$$s_i(a) = y_i + ra - c_i(a), \quad c_i(a) = (u')^{-1}(v_i'(a)),$$

$$\int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} (g_1(a) + g_2(a))da = 1, \quad g_1, g_2 \geq 0$$

- The two PDEs (HJB) and (KF) together with (EQ) fully characterize stationary equilibrium [▶ Derivation of \(HJB\)](#) [▶ \(KF\)](#)

Transition Dynamics

$$0 = S(r, t) := \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} ag_1(a, t)da + \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} ag_2(a, t)da \quad (\text{EQ})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \rho v_i(a, t) = \max_c & u(c) + \partial_a v_i(a, t)(y_i + r(t)a - c) \\ & + \lambda_i(v_j(a, t) - v_i(a, t)) + \partial_t v_i(a, t), \end{aligned} \quad (\text{HJB})$$

$$\partial_t g_i(a, t) = -\partial_a[s_i(a, t)g_i(a, t)] - \lambda_i g_i(a, t) + \lambda_j g_j(a, t), \quad (\text{KF})$$

$$s_i(a, t) = y_i + r(t)a - c_i(a, t), \quad c_i(a, t) = (u')^{-1}(\partial_a v_i(a, t)),$$

$$\int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} (g_1(a, t) + g_2(a, t))da = 1, \quad g_1, g_2 \geq 0$$

- Given initial condition $g_{i,0}(a)$, the two PDEs (HJB) and (KF) together with (EQ) fully characterize equilibrium.
- Notation: for any function f , $\partial_x f$ means $\frac{\partial f}{\partial x}$

Borrowing Constraints?

- Q: where is borrowing constraint $a \geq \underline{a}$ in (HJB)?
- A: “in” boundary condition
- **Result:** v_i must satisfy

$$v_i'(\underline{a}) \geq u'(y_i + r\underline{a}), \quad i = 1, 2 \quad (\text{BC})$$

- **Derivation:**
 - the FOC still holds at the borrowing constraint

$$u'(c_i(\underline{a})) = v_i'(\underline{a}) \quad (\text{FOC})$$

- for borrowing constraint not to be violated, need

$$s_i(\underline{a}) = y_i + r\underline{a} - c_i(\underline{a}) \geq 0 \quad (*)$$

- (FOC) and (*) \Rightarrow (BC).
- See slides on viscosity solutions for more rigorous discussion

Plan

1. Consumption, saving and inequality in partial equilibrium
2. General equilibrium
3. Computations

MPCs and Speed of Hitting Borrowing Constraint

Behavior near borrowing constraint depends on two factors

1. tightness of constraint
2. properties of u as $c \rightarrow 0$

Assumption 1:

The coefficient of absolute risk aversion $R(c) = -u''(c)/u'(c)$ when wealth a approaches the borrowing limit \underline{a} is finite, that is

$$\underline{R} = - \lim_{a \rightarrow \underline{a}} \frac{u''(y_1 + ra)}{u'(y_1 + ra)} < \infty$$

- **sufficient condition for A1:** borrowing constraint is tighter than “natural borrowing constraint” $\underline{a} > -y_1/r$
- e.g. with CRRA utility

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \underline{R} = \frac{\gamma}{y_1 + r\underline{a}}$$

- but weaker: e.g. A1 satisfied by $\underline{a} = -y_1/r$, $u(c) = -\gamma e^{-\gamma c}$

MPCs and Speed of Hitting Borrowing Constraint

Proposition

Assume $r < \rho$, $y_1 < y_2$ and that A1 holds. The solution to (HJB) has following properties:

1. $s_1(\underline{a}) = 0$ but $s_1(a) < 0$ all $a > \underline{a}$: only households exactly at the borrowing constraint are constrained.
2. Saving and consumption policy functions close to $a = \underline{a}$ satisfy



$$s_1(a) \approx -\nu \sqrt{a - \underline{a}}$$

$$c_1(a) \approx y_1 + ra + \nu \sqrt{a - \underline{a}}$$

$$c_1'(a) \approx r + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\nu}{\sqrt{a - \underline{a}}}$$

$$\nu = \sqrt{2 \frac{(\rho - r)u'(c_1) + \lambda_1[u'(c_1) - u'(c_2)]}{-u''(c_1)}} > 0$$

Consumption, Savings at Borrowing Constraint



Consumption, Savings at Borrowing Constraint

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$$c_1'(a) \approx r + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\nu}{\sqrt{a - \underline{a}}}$$

$$\nu = \sqrt{2 \frac{(\rho - r)u'(c_1) + \lambda_1 [u'(c_1) - u'(c_2)]}{-u''(c_1)}} > 0 \sqrt{\frac{2c_1}{\gamma} (\rho - r + \lambda_1 [1 - (c_2/c_1)])}$$

Saving Behavior at Borrowing Constraint

Corollary

The wealth of worker who keeps y_1 converges to borrowing constraint in finite time at speed governed by ν :

$$a(t) - \underline{a} \approx \left[\left(\sqrt{a_0 - \underline{a}} - \frac{\nu}{2} t \right)^+ \right]^2$$

Derivation: integrate $\dot{a}(t) = -\nu \sqrt{a(t) - \underline{a}}$

Note: similarity to [stopping time](#) problems

Stationary Wealth Distribution

- Recall equation for stationary distribution

$$0 = -\frac{d}{da}[s_i(a)g_i(a)] - \lambda_i g_i(a) + \lambda_j g_j(a) \quad (\text{KF})$$


- Lemma:** the solution to (KF) is

$$g_i(a) = \frac{\kappa_i}{s_i(a)} \exp\left(-\int_{\underline{a}}^a \left(\frac{\lambda_1}{s_1(x)} + \frac{\lambda_2}{s_2(x)} dx\right)\right)$$

with κ_1, κ_2 pinned down by g_i 's integrating to one



- Corollary:** Dirac **point mass** of type y_1 individuals at constraint $\lim_{a \rightarrow \underline{a}} g_1(a) = \infty$

Stationary Wealth Distribution





Note: in numerical solution, Dirac mass = finite spike in density


General Equilibrium



Increase in r from r_L to $r_H > r_L$



Stationary Equilibrium



$$\text{Asset Supply } S(r) = \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} ag_1(a; r)da + \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} ag_2(a; r)da$$

- **Proposition:** a stationary equilibrium exists
- **Big open question:** **uniqueness**. Any ideas? Need to find conditions s.t. $S'(r) \geq 0$.

Computations for Heterogeneous Agent Model

Computations for Heterogeneous Agent Model

- **Hard part:** HJB equation. But already know how to do that
- **Easy part:** KF equation. Once you solved HJB equation, get KF equation “for free”
- System to be solved

$$\rho v_1(a) = \max_c u(c) + v_1'(a)(y_1 + ra - c) + \lambda_1(v_2(a) - v_1(a))$$

$$\rho v_2(a) = \max_c u(c) + v_2'(a)(y_2 + ra - c) + \lambda_2(v_1(a) - v_2(a))$$

$$0 = -\frac{d}{da}[s_1(a)g_1(a)] - \lambda_1 g_1(a) + \lambda_2 g_2(a)$$

$$0 = -\frac{d}{da}[s_2(a)g_2(a)] - \lambda_2 g_2(a) + \lambda_1 g_1(a)$$

$$1 = \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} g_1(a) da + \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} g_2(a) da$$

$$0 = \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} a g_1(a) da + \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} a g_2(a) da := S(r)$$


Computations for Heterogeneous Agent Model

- As before, discretized HJB equation is

$$\rho \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{u}(\mathbf{v}) + \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{v})\mathbf{v} \quad (\text{HJBd})$$

- \mathbf{A} is $N \times N$ transition matrix
 - here $N = 2 \times I$, I =number of wealth grid points
 - \mathbf{A} depends on \mathbf{v} (nonlinear problem)
 - solve using implicit scheme

Visualization of \mathbf{A} (output of `spy(A)` in Matlab)



Computing the FK Equation

- Equations to be solved

$$0 = -\frac{d}{da}[s_1(a)g_1(a)] - \lambda_1 g_1(a) + \lambda_2 g_2(a)$$

$$0 = -\frac{d}{da}[s_2(a)g_2(a)] - \lambda_2 g_2(a) + \lambda_1 g_1(a)$$

with $1 = \int_a^\infty g_1(a)da + \int_a^\infty g_2(a)da$

- Actually, super easy: discretized version is simply


$$0 = \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{v})^T \mathbf{g} \quad (\text{KFd})$$

- **eigenvalue problem**
- get KF for free, one more reason for using implicit scheme
- Why transpose? See lectures 6 and 7
 - operator in (HJB) is **“adjoint”** of operator in (KF)
 - “adjoint” = infinite-dimensional analogue of matrix transpose
- In principle, can use similar strategy in discrete time

Finding the Equilibrium Interest Rate

Use bisection method

- increase r whenever $S(r) < 0$
- decrease r whenever $S(r) > 0$



A Model with a Continuum of Income Types

- Assume idiosyncratic income follows diffusion process

$$dy_t = \mu(y_t)dt + \sigma(y_t)dW_t$$

- Reflecting barriers at \underline{y} and \bar{y}

$$\rho v(a, y) = \max_c u(c) + \partial_a v(a, y)(y + ra - c) + \mu(y)\partial_y v(a, y) + \frac{\sigma^2(y)}{2}\partial_{yy} v(a, y)$$

$$0 = -\partial_a [s(a, y)g(a, y)] - \partial_y [\mu(y)g(a, y)] + \frac{1}{2}\partial_{yy} [\sigma^2(y)g(a, y)]$$

$$1 = \int_0^\infty \int_{\underline{a}}^\infty g(a, y) da dy$$

$$0 = \int_0^\infty \int_{\underline{a}}^\infty ag(a, y) da dy := S(r)$$


- Borrowing constraint: $\partial_a v(\underline{a}, y) \geq u'(y + r\underline{a})$, all y
- reflecting barriers (see e.g. Dixit “Art of Smooth Pasting”)

$$0 = \partial_y v(a, \underline{y}) = \partial_y v(a, \bar{y})$$



It doesn't matter whether you solve ODEs or PDEs
⇒ everything generalizes

http://www.princeton.edu/~moll/HACTproject/huggett_diffusion_partialeq.m

Visualization of \mathbf{A} (output of `spy(A)` in Matlab)



Saving Policy Function and Stationary Distribution



Transition Dynamics/MIT Shocks

Transition Dynamics

Do Aiyagari version of the model

$$r(t) = F_K(K(t), 1) - \delta, \quad w(t) = F_L(K(t), 1) \quad (\text{P})$$

$$K(t) = \int ag_1(a, t)da + \int ag_2(a, t)da \quad (\text{K})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \rho v_i(a, t) = \max_c & u(c) + \partial_a v_i(a, t)(w(t)z_i + r(t)a - c) \\ & + \lambda_i(v_j(a, t) - v_i(a, t)) + \partial_t v_i(a, t), \end{aligned} \quad (\text{HJB})$$

$$\partial_t g_i(a, t) = -\partial_a[s_i(a, t)g_i(a, t)] - \lambda_i g_i(a, t) + \lambda_j g_j(a, t), \quad (\text{KF})$$

$$s_i(a, t) = w(t)z_i + r(t)a - c_i(a, t), \quad c_i(a, t) = (u')^{-1}(\partial_a v_i(a, t))$$

- Given initial condition $g_{i,0}(a)$, the two PDEs (HJB) and (KF) together with (P) and (K) fully characterize equilibrium.

Transition Dynamics

- Recall discretized equations for stationary equilibrium

$$\rho \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{u}(\mathbf{v}) + \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{v})\mathbf{v}$$

$$0 = \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{v})^\top \mathbf{g}$$

- Transition dynamics

- denote $v_{i,j}^n = v_i(a_j, t^n)$ and stack into \mathbf{v}^n

- denote $g_{i,j}^n = g_i(a_j, t^n)$ and stack into \mathbf{g}^n

$$\rho \mathbf{v}^n = \mathbf{u}(\mathbf{v}^{n+1}) + \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{v}^{n+1})\mathbf{v}^n + \frac{1}{\Delta t}(\mathbf{v}^{n+1} - \mathbf{v}^n)$$

$$\frac{\mathbf{g}^{n+1} - \mathbf{g}^n}{\Delta t} = \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{v}^n)^\top \mathbf{g}^{n+1}$$

- Terminal condition for \mathbf{v} : $\mathbf{v}^N = \mathbf{v}_\infty$ (steady state)
- Initial condition for \mathbf{g} : $\mathbf{g}^1 = \mathbf{g}_0$.


Transition Dynamics

- (HJB) looks forward, runs backwards in time
- (KF) looks backward, runs forward in time
- **Algorithm:** Guess $K^0(t)$ and then for $\ell = 0, 1, 2, \dots$
 1. find prices $r^\ell(t)$ and $w^\ell(t)$
 2. solve (HJB) backwards in time given terminal cond'n $v_{i,\infty}(a)$
 3. solve (KF) forward in time given given initial condition $g_{i,0}(a)$
 4. Compute $S^\ell(t) = \int ag_1^\ell(a, t)da + \int ag_2^\ell(a, t)da$
 5. Update $K^{\ell+1}(t) = (1 - \xi)K^\ell(t) + \xi S^\ell(t)$ where $\xi \in (0, 1]$ is a relaxation parameter

An MIT Shock

Modification: $Y_t = F_t(K, L) = A_t K^\alpha L^{1-\alpha}$, $dA_t = \nu(\bar{A} - A_t)dt$

http://www.princeton.edu/~moll/HACTproject/aiyagari_poisson_MITshock.m



Open Questions

- Title of course/lecture “Income and Wealth Distribution in Macro”
- Aiyagari-Bewley-Huggett model = rich theory of wealth distribution
 - caveat: ability to match data? See problem set
 - either way, important building block for richer models
- ... but no deep theory of income distribution
 - labor income = $w \times z$, z = exogenous process
 - capital income = $r \times a$, i.e. proportional to wealth
- Can we do better?
 - idea: marry with assignment model \Rightarrow income = $w(z)$, $w'' \neq 0$
- References:
 - Sattinger (1979), “Differential Rents and the Distribution of Earnings”
 - these Acemoglu lecture notes <http://economics.mit.edu/files/10480>
 - Gabaix and Landier (2008), “Why has CEO Pay Increased so Much?”
 - Acemoglu and Autor (2011), “Skills, Tasks and Technologies”

Open Question: Less Restrictive Assignment Models?

- Sattinger setup, notation in <http://economics.mit.edu/files/10480>
- Workers with skill s , CDF $H(s)$
- Firms with productivity x , CDF $G(x)$
- One-to-one matching, output $f(x, s)$
- Result: if $f_{xs}(x, s) > 0$ all (x, s) (f is supermodular), then “positive assortative matching” (PAM), assignment equation is

$$x = \phi(s) \quad \text{with} \quad \phi' > 0$$

- Wage function $w(s)$ found from $w'(s) = f_s(\phi(s), s) \Rightarrow w''(s) > 0$
- Open question:
 - supermodularity = strong, sufficient condition for obtaining assignment equation $x = \phi(s)$
 - possible to obtain assignment equation under weaker assumptions than supermodularity, still able to say something?

Appendix

Derivation of Poisson KF Equation [▶ Back](#)

- Work with CDF (in wealth dimension)

$$G_i(a, t) := \Pr(\tilde{a}_t \leq a, \tilde{y}_t = y_i)$$

- Income switches from y_i to y_j with probability $\Delta\lambda_j$
- Over period of length Δ , wealth evolves as $\tilde{a}_{t+\Delta} = \tilde{a}_t + \Delta s_i(\tilde{a}_t)$
- Similarly, answer to question “where did $\tilde{a}_{t+\Delta}$ come from?” is

$$\tilde{a}_t = \tilde{a}_{t+\Delta} - \Delta s_i(\tilde{a}_{t+\Delta})$$

- Momentarily ignoring income switches and assuming $s_i(a) < 0$

$$\Pr(\tilde{a}_{t+\Delta} \leq a) = \underbrace{\Pr(\tilde{a}_t \leq a)}_{\text{already below } a} + \underbrace{\Pr(a \leq \tilde{a}_t \leq a - \Delta s_i(a))}_{\text{cross threshold } a} = \Pr(\tilde{a}_t \leq a - \Delta s_i(a))$$

- Fraction of people with wealth below a evolves as

$$\Pr(\tilde{a}_{t+\Delta} \leq a, \tilde{y}_{t+\Delta} = y_i) = (1 - \Delta\lambda_j) \Pr(\tilde{a}_t \leq a - \Delta s_i(a), \tilde{y}_t = y_i) \\ + \Delta\lambda_j \Pr(\tilde{a}_t \leq a - \Delta s_j(a), \tilde{y}_t = y_j)$$

- Intuition: if have wealth $< a - \Delta s_i(a)$ at t , have wealth $< a$ at $t + \Delta$ 45

Derivation of Poisson KF Equation

- Subtracting $G_i(a, t)$ from both sides and dividing by Δ

$$\frac{G_i(a, t + \Delta) - G_i(a, t)}{\Delta} = \frac{G_i(a - \Delta s_i(a), t) - G_i(a, t)}{\Delta} - \lambda_i G_i(a - \Delta s_i(a), t) + \lambda_j G_j(a - \Delta s_i(a), t)$$

- Taking the limit as $\Delta \rightarrow 0$

$$\partial_t G_i(a, t) = -s_i(a) \partial_a G_i(a, t) - \lambda_i G_i(a, t) + \lambda_j G_j(a, t)$$

where we have used that

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\Delta \rightarrow 0} \frac{G_i(a - \Delta s_i(a), t) - G_i(a, t)}{\Delta} &= \lim_{x \rightarrow 0} \frac{G_i(a - x, t) - G_i(a, t)}{x} s_i(a) \\ &= -s_i(a) \partial_a G_i(a, t) \end{aligned}$$

- Intuition: if $s_i(a) < 0$, $\Pr(\tilde{a}_t \leq a, \tilde{y}_t = y_i)$ increases at rate $g_i(a, t)$
- Differentiate w.r.t. a and use $g_i(a, t) = \partial_a G_i(a, t) \Rightarrow$

$$\partial_t g_i(a, t) = -\partial_a [s_i(a, t) g_i(a, t)] - \lambda_i g_i(a, t) + \lambda_j g_j(a, t)$$