# Lecture 5: Competitive Equilibrium in the Growth Model

ECO 503: Macroeconomic Theory I

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## Competitive Eqm in the Growth Model

- Recall two issues we are interested in regarding resource allocation problems
  - efficient allocations

2 decentralized equilibrium allocations

- So far did (1). Now consider (2).
- Focus on particular decentralized equilibrium concept: competitive equilibrium
  - see Lecture 1
  - benchmark notion of decentralized eqm, but not only one

#### Competitive Eqm in the Growth Model

- Static economies: one way to formulate CE
- Dynamic economies: three ways to formulate CE
  - 1 "Arrow-Debreu CE" (ADCE)
  - ② "Sequence of Markets CE" (SOMCE)
  - 3 "Recursive CE" (RCE)
- Outcomes same for all three. Just different representations.
- Begin with ADCE
  - extension of static CE
  - but defining commodities as pairs of goods  $\times$  time

#### Preliminaries

- Detail to consider in economy with capital: who owns capital?
  - households who then rent it to firms?
  - firms who own capital who are in turn owned by households?
  - reality: see some of each
- Turns out this is of no substantive importance in this setting
  - lecture: assume capital owned by HH and rented to firms
  - homework: other extreme
- Also assume single "stand-in" firm
  - homework: show that this is harmless
- We also go back to discrete-time formulation

#### ADCE

Definition: An ADCE for the growth model are sequences {c<sub>t</sub><sup>h</sup>, h<sub>t</sub><sup>h</sup>, k<sub>t</sub><sup>h</sup>, k<sub>t</sub><sup>f</sup>, h<sub>t</sub><sup>f</sup>, p<sub>t</sub>, w<sub>t</sub>, R<sub>t</sub>}<sup>∞</sup><sub>t=0</sub> s.t.
 (HH max) Taking {p<sub>t</sub>, w<sub>t</sub>, R<sub>t</sub>} as given, {c<sub>t</sub><sup>h</sup>, h<sub>t</sub><sup>h</sup>, k<sub>t</sub><sup>h</sup>} solves

$$\max_{\{c_t^h, h_t^h, k_t^h\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \quad \text{s.t.}$$

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t(c_t^h + k_{t+1}^h - (1-\delta)k_t^h) \le \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (R_t k_t + w_t h_t)$$

$$c_t^h \ge 0, \quad 0 \le h_t^h \le 1, \quad k_{t+1}^h \ge 0, \quad k_0^h = \bar{k}_0$$

 $\textbf{(Firm max) Taking } \{p_t, w_t, R_t\} \text{ as given, } \{k_t^f, h_t^f\} \text{ solves} \\ \max_{\{k_t^f, h_t^f\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (p_t F(k_t^f, h_t^f) - w_t h_t^f - R_t k_t^f) \quad k_t^f \ge 0, \quad h_t^f \ge 0.$ 

3 (Market clearing) For each t:

$$k_t^h = k_t^f, \quad h_t^h = h_t^f, \quad c_t^h + k_{t+1}^h - (1 - \delta)k_t^h = F(k_t^f, h_t^f)$$

#### Comments

- Single budget constraint for HH
- Prices take care of discounting implicitly
- Everything happens at t = 0

# Simplifying

An ADCE for the growth model are sequences {c<sub>t</sub>, h<sub>t</sub>, k<sub>t</sub>, p<sub>t</sub>, w<sub>t</sub>, R<sub>t</sub>}<sup>∞</sup><sub>t=0</sub> s.t.
 (HH max) Taking {p<sub>t</sub>, w<sub>t</sub>, R<sub>t</sub>} as given, {c<sub>t</sub>, h<sub>t</sub>, k<sub>t</sub>} solves

$$\begin{split} \max_{\{c_t, h_t, k_t\}} & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \quad \text{s.t.} \\ & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t(c_t + k_{t+1} - (1-\delta)k_t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (R_t k_t + w_t h_t) \\ & c_t \geq 0, \quad 0 \leq h_t \leq 1, \quad k_{t+1} \geq 0, \quad k_0 = \bar{k}_0 \end{split}$$

2 (Firm max) Taking  $\{p_t, w_t, R_t\}$  as given,  $\{k_t, h_t\}$  solves

$$\max_{\{k_t,h_t\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (p_t F(k_t,h_t) - w_t h_t - R_t k_t) \quad k_t \ge 0, \quad h_t \ge 0.$$

**3** (Market clearing) For each *t*:

$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1-\delta)k_t = F(k_t, h_t)$$

(k and h markets clear implicitly)

- First Welfare Theorem applies, so could simply use fact that ADCE allocation = planner's allocation
- But will later consider environments with various distortions (taxes, monopoly power, financial frictions) in which this fails
- ⇒ want to know how to solve for ADCE even when First Welfare Theorem fails. Consider such method now.
- General idea:
  - for each piece of ADCE: max problem  $\Rightarrow$  necessary conditions
  - + market clearing

• Necessary conditions for consumer problem ( $h_t = 1 \text{ wlog}$ )

$$c_t$$
:  $\beta^t u'(c_t) = \lambda p_t$ ,  $\lambda$  = multiplier on b.c. (1)

$$k_{t+1}: \quad \lambda p_t + \lambda [-p_{t+1}(1-\delta) - R_{t+1}] = 0$$
 (2)

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t(c_t + k_{t+1} - (1-\delta)k_t) \le \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (R_t k_t + w_t) \qquad (3)$$

$$\mathsf{TVC}: \quad \lim_{T \to \infty} \beta^T u'(c_T) k_{T+1} = 0 \tag{4}$$

initial: 
$$k_0 = \bar{k}_0$$
 (5)

• Necessary conditions for firm problem

$$p_t F_k(k_t, h_t) = R_t \tag{6}$$

$$p_t F_h(k_t, h_t) = w_t \tag{7}$$

Market clearing

$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = F(k_t, h_t)$$
 (8) <sub>9/2</sub>

## Characterizing ADCE: TVC?

 As before, can think of TVC (4) as coming from finite horizon problem

$$\max_{\{c_t,h_t,k_t\}} \sum_{t=0}^{T} \beta^t u(c_t) \quad \text{s.t.}$$

$$\sum_{t=0}^{T} p_t(c_t + k_{t+1} - (1-\delta)k_t) \le \sum_{t=0}^{T} (R_t k_t + w_t h_t), \quad k_{t+1} \ge 0$$

• Denote multipliers by  $\lambda, \mu_t$ , necessary conditions at t = T are

$$\beta^{T} u'(c_{T}) = \lambda p_{T}$$
$$\lambda p_{T} = \mu_{T} \qquad \Rightarrow \qquad \beta^{T} u'(c_{T}) k_{T+1} = 0$$
$$\mu_{T} k_{T+1} = 0$$

• Use (1) at *t* and *t* + 1

$$\frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} = \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}}$$
(9)

• From (2)

$$\frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} = \frac{R_{t+1}}{p_{t+1}} + 1 - \delta$$
$$\Rightarrow \frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} = \frac{R_{t+1}}{p_{t+1}} + 1 - \delta$$

• From (6)

$$\frac{R_t}{p_t} = F_k(k_t, 1) = f'(k_t)$$

$$\Rightarrow \quad \frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} = f'(k_{t+1}) + 1 - \delta \tag{10}$$

Recall

$$\frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} = f'(k_{t+1}) + 1 - \delta$$
 (10)

- (10) + TVC (4) + initial condition (5) + market clearing (8) = same set of equations as for SP problem
- Hence: ADCE allocation is the same for the SP problem
- How get prices?
  - can always normalize one price to unity: wlog set  $p_0 = 1$
  - get  $R_0, w_0$  from (6) and (7) at t = 0
  - get  $p_1$  from (9) given  $c_0, c_1, p_0$
  - get  $R_1, w_1$  from (6) and (7) at t = 1 given  $p_1$
  - ...

#### Aside: Walras' Law

- Q: Why didn't we use budget constraint (3)?
- A: because it is implied by the other equations, in particular firm's problem + market clearing (8) ⇒ (3)
- Firm's problem and market clearing are

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (p_t F(k_t, h_t) - w_t h_t - R_t k_t) = 0$$
 (11)

$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = F(k_t, h_t)$$
(12)

Substituting (12) into (11) gives (3):

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} [p_t(c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t) - w_t h_t - R_t k_t] = 0$$

- This is "Walras' Law" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walras'\_law
  - very general: all budget constraints  $\Rightarrow$  resource constraint
  - useful check when writing models: if Walras' Law doesn't hold, you did something wrong (e.g. forgot term in mkt clearing)

#### Steady State ADCE

- Definition: A St.st. ADCE is a value of k\* and an ADCE for the economy with k
  <sub>0</sub> = k\* s.t. k<sub>t</sub> = k\* (and c<sub>t</sub> = c\*) for all t.
- Clearly from (9)  $\label{eq:generalized_states} rac{1}{eta} = f'(k^*) + 1 \delta$
- $\Rightarrow k^*$  same as in SP problem
- Question: what do you think prices look like in a st.st. ADCE?
  - $p_t = \text{constant}?$
  - $R_t = \text{constant}?$
  - $w_t = \text{constant}?$

#### Steady State ADCE

Let's work it out

Have

$$\frac{u'(c^*)}{\beta u'(c^*)} = \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \frac{p_{t+1}}{p_t} = \beta$$

• normalizing  $p_0 = 1$ 

$$p_t = \beta^t$$

Also

$$\frac{R_t}{p_t} = F_k(k^*, 1), \quad \frac{w_t}{p_t} = F_h(k^*, 1)$$

- Summary:
  - $R_t/p_t, w_t/p_t$  constant
  - $R_t, w_t, p_t$  decreasing at rate  $\beta$
- So prices are not constant in st.st. ADCE
  - · prices implicitly reflect discounting of future values
  - price of future output is lower
  - return to future work is lower

## Alternative Pricing Convention

- Denote factor prices relative to output price in each period
- Write budget constraint as

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t(c_t+k_{t+1}-(1-\delta)k_t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{p_t}{\tilde{R}_t}(\tilde{R}_tk_t+\tilde{w}_th_t)$$

- This formulation is useful for thinking about real rates of return and interest rates in ADCE
  - no explicit credit market in ADCE
  - but can infer implicit real interest rate on one-period ahead borrowing and lending

## Alternative Pricing Convention

- Denote real interest rate by  $r_t$
- Definition: 1 + r<sub>t+1</sub> = amount of consumption you can get tomorrow by giving up unit of consumption today
  - giving up one unit today saves p<sub>t</sub>
  - with this you buy  $p_t/p_{t+1}$  tomorrow

$$\Rightarrow 1 + r_{t+1} = \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}}$$

- In steady state,  $1+\mathit{r_t}=1/eta$
- Real rate of return on capital: from HH max. w.r.t.  $k_{t+1}$

$$p_t = p_{t+1}\tilde{R}_{t+1} + p_{t+1}(1-\delta)$$

- buy 1 unit of k today, get  $p_{t+1} ilde{R}_{t+1} + p_{t+1}(1-\delta)$  tomorrow
- must equal cost of doing so p<sub>t</sub>

$$1 + r_{t+1} = \tilde{R}_{t+1} + 1 - \delta \quad \Rightarrow \quad \tilde{R}_t = r_t + \delta$$

• Terminology: rental rate  $ilde{R}_t =$  "user cost of capital"  $r_t + \delta$